

PLSC 695 / GLOBL 7540

International Security

Spring 2024

Meeting Time: Wed. 9:25-11:15am

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Professor Matthew Fuhrmann

Email: matthew.fuhrmann@yale.edu

Website: www.matthewfuhrmann.com

Office Hours: Monday and Wednesday, 4-5pm. Please make an appointment at: <https://calendly.com/mcfuhrmann/office-hours>. If you are unavailable during my office hours, please email me to make an appointment at another time.

Course Description

This graduate seminar offers a survey of topics in the field of international security. The course is structured around major debates including: Do nuclear weapons make coercive diplomacy more effective? Do democracies have advantages in international coercive bargaining? Can military alliances mitigate the risk of conflict, or do they increase it? Do reputations matter in international politics? How much do individual leaders make a difference? The purpose of this course is to examine and critique broad theoretical arguments – not to learn about any particular country or war. The course is divided into three main parts. Part I addresses different approaches to studying international security, ranging from a focus on the distribution of power in the international system to individual politicians. Part II focuses on how countries can manage threats to their security by augmenting their power, forming alliances, and using military force. Part III addresses contemporary challenges such as terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. This course is designed primarily for PhD students in Political Science and master’s students in the Jackson School for Global Affairs. The course will be capped at 18 students.

Student Learning Outcomes

The course is designed to develop the following knowledge and skills:

- **Understanding international security problems.** Students will learn what existing scholarship teaches us about particular international security issues.
- **Critique existing research.** What are the limitations of this work? How could it be improved? When critiquing, always bear in mind that it is harder to build something than it is to tear it down.
- **Integrate knowledge on a given topic.** “We can group the vast literature on TOPIC X into the following three schools of thought...”

- **Identify original research questions.** What is worth explaining? How do you know?
- **Develop logically sound arguments.** How can you build a compelling theory to explain some aspect of international politics?
- **Appropriately design scholarly research.** Any theory must generate testable predictions. Otherwise, it is not falsifiable. How do you design a study to test your theory's predictions.
- **Writing effectively.** Being able to write clearly and succinctly is critical to succeeding in any professional sector.
- **Presenting effectively.** Students will develop skills to present social science effectively.
- **Policy implications.** Understanding how to design and interpret research that is relevant to policy is an important skill on which this class will focus.

Course Policies

- **Writing Assistance.** Poorvu's Graduate Writing Lab is a resource for all graduate students seeking writing assistance: <https://poorvucenter.yale.edu/writing/graduate>. Students in the Jackson School can consult with the Jackson Writing Program (see <https://campuspress.yale.edu/jscp/writing-program/>). Jackson students can book an online appointment at <https://yalejackson.mywconline.com/>.
- **Academic Integrity Policy.** It is the student's obligation to understand and abide by the university's policies on plagiarism and academic misconduct. I will refer all cases of suspected misconduct to the appropriate Dean. If you have any questions about what constitutes plagiarism, please contact me.
- **AI Policy.** The use of ChatGPT or other AI composition software is not permitted in this course.
- **Late Work Policy.** I will accept assignments after the deadlines indicated in the syllabus, with the imposition of a penalty. I will subtract 10 points for each 24-hour period that an assignment is late. If extenuating circumstances arise, students may request that I waive this penalty. I will handle requests to waive late penalties on a case-by-case basis. As a general rule, waiver requests will be granted only in cases of severe hardship.
- **Re-grading Policy.** Students may request that assignments be re-graded if they believe that they have been unfairly evaluated. Requests for such re-evaluations must be delivered to me in typewritten form (these requests cannot be e-mailed) along with the assignment within one week after assignments are returned. The written statement must include specific reasons why the student believes the assignment was

graded unfairly as well as their assessment of what grade they deserve. I will then re-grade the assignment. Note that the new grade may be the same, higher, or lower than the original grade.

- **Diversity, Equity, Inclusion, and Belonging (DEIB).** This course will invite a diversity of perspectives and foster a welcoming and inclusive environment. I believe that everyone has important ideas to contribute, regardless of their background. It is critical that our discussions are respectful of diverging viewpoints and that we reject all forms of discrimination and prejudice. You can find additional resources for DEIB issues at Yale [here](#) and [here](#).*
- **Accessibility.** “Your success in this class is important to me. We will all need accommodations because we all learn differently. If there are aspects of this course that prevent you from learning or that form barriers to your inclusion, please let me know as soon as possible. Together we’ll develop strategies that can enable you to succeed in the course. I encourage you to visit Student Accessibility Services to determine how you could improve your learning as well. If you need official accommodations, you have a right to have these met. There is also a range of resources on campus, including the Writing Center, Residential College Tutors, and Academic Strategies.”†

Course Requirements

There are six main requirements for this seminar:

- **Presentations.** Each week (starting on January 31), students will give presentations in small groups based on the readings. These presentations will set the stage for our class discussion. They should do the following: (1) summarize the question(s) being debated in the readings, (2) explain why the debate matters, (3) overview the arguments and evidence on the debate, (4) make an argument about which view the student finds most compelling, and (5) identify specific questions they would like the class to discuss based on the readings. These presentations should last 20 minutes. Your presentation days will be assigned by the professor during the first week of the semester. These presentations constitute **15 percent** of your final grade.
- **“Ideas papers.”** Students will write short papers (1-2 pages) describing an idea that emerged from the course readings. Each student will write two of these papers during the semester at times of their choosing. The papers must be written between January 24 and March 27. This will constitute **10 percent** of your grade. These papers must be submitted via Canvas prior to the start of class.
 - *Political Science PhD Students:* Describe an idea for an original research paper. These write-ups should lay out a paper that could be written if the student chose

*This statement is based on resources and examples provided by the Poorvu Center for Teaching and Learning here: <https://poorvucenter.yale.edu/DiversityStatements>.

†This text is taken directly from the Poorvu Center for Teaching and Learning here: <https://poorvucenter.yale.edu/AccessibilityStatements>.

to pursue the idea. Students will be graded based on three criteria: (1) thoughtfulness, (2) creativity, and (3) the potential to advance knowledge on the topic.

- *Global Affairs Master's Students*: Describe a research paper, as articulated above, or a policy idea for the United States (or any other international actor) to pursue, based on the week's readings. Policy ideas will be graded based on three criteria: (1) the creativity of the idea, (2) the degree to which the idea follows from the readings, and (3) the viability of the idea based on the costs and benefits of implementing it.

- **Class Participation.** I expect students will come to class prepared, having read all of the assigned readings. Class participation represents **20 percent** of your grade. I will record participation scores at the end of each class based on the following 5-point scale:

- 4: The student did the following: (1) participated consistently throughout the session; (2) showed that they have read and comprehended the readings; (3) displayed an ability to integrate the literature; and (4) demonstrated that they can identify shortcomings in the research and articulate how one might do better in the future.
- 3: One of the above areas is lacking.
- 2: Two of the above areas are lacking.
- 1: Three or more of the above areas are lacking.
- 0: The student did not attend class and did not have an excused absence.

- **Literature Review.** Students will write a 2,000 word literature review that (1) identifies an important research question, (2) synthesizes existing scholarly research on that question, (3) critiques the work that has been done to date, and (4) identifies new opportunities for research. This will constitute **15 percent** of your grade.

- **Initial Paper Submission.** Building on the literature review, students will complete one of two assignments (**20 percent** of your grade):

- *Political Science PhD Students*: Write a research design for a study on international security. The research design should include a theory section and a strategy for testing the argument, in addition to the material prepared for the literature review. This should be written like a typical academic paper in a peer-reviewed journal, but the proposed research does not need to be implemented. The length should be approximately 7,000 words.
- *Global Affairs Master's Students*: Write a policy memo based on the literature review. The memo should give guidance to a senior government official about options for handling a policy problem. In particular, it should: (1) identify a specific policy choice that needs to be made, (2) outline relevant background information, (3) give the senior official at least two options for dealing with the problem, (4) analyze the strengths and weaknesses of each option, and (5) provide

a specific recommendation. The policy choice should be related to the topic of the literature review. If your literature review is about why countries build nuclear weapons, for example, the policy problem could be how to keep Iran from building the bomb. The page limit is two single-spaced pages.

- **Revise and Resubmit.** I will review the initial submission. For research designs, I will act like an anonymous reviewer for a journal. For policy memos, I will play the role of the senior official. In both cases, you will receive feedback from me. You will then revise your work to address my feedback. When submitting your revised paper, you must include a revision memo that details that changes you have made to the paper in response to my feedback. The revised paper constitutes **20 percent** of your grade.

Key Deadlines

- January 24 – March 27: Ideas papers due.
- April 3: Literature review due.
- April 17: Initial paper submission due.
- May 5: Final paper due.

Course Outline

- January 17: Course Introduction

Part I: Studying International Security

- January 24: System Polarity
 - Debate: How does the global distribution of power influence international conflict dynamics? Does it matter whether we live in a unipolar world or a bipolar one?
- January 31: Domestic Politics I: Democratic Peace
 - Debate: Are democracies more peaceful?
- February 7: Domestic Politics II: Audience Costs
 - Debate: Do democracies have advantages in international bargaining?
- February 14: Leaders
 - Debate: Do individual leaders matter?

Part II: Managing Threats

- February 21: The Nuclear Revolution

- Debate: How do nuclear weapons influence world politics? Does possessing a nuclear arsenal provide countries with political advantages in international bargaining?
- February 28: Coercive Diplomacy and Signaling
 - Can countries win without a fight? If so, how?
- March 6: Military Alliances
 - Do alliances cause peace or invite conflict?
- March 27: Air Power and Uses of Force
 - Debate: Can states get their way by punishing their adversaries militarily? Is airpower an effective tool of military coercion?

Part III: Challenges

- April 3: Reputation and Resolve
 - Debate: Do reputations matter in international politics?
- April 10: Nuclear Proliferation
 - Debate: Why do countries build nuclear weapons?
- April 17: Terrorism and Political Violence
 - Debate: How can governments stop terrorism?
- April 24: Grand Strategy
 - Debate: How can the United States best advance its national security?

Course Readings

All of the assigned articles are available through the TAMU library in databases such as JSTOR or Google Scholar. Please let me know if you have questions about how to access the articles. We will read portions of several books. You may purchase these books, but the relevant excerpts will be available through Canvas.

January 17: Course Introduction

- Lake, David A. 2011. “Why ‘isms’ Are Evil: Theory, Epistemology, and Academic Sects as Impediments to Understanding and Progress.” *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 55, No. 2, pp. 465-480.

January 24: System Polarity

Required Reading

- Nuno Monteiro. *Theory of Unipolar Politics*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. Chapters 1-4.
- William Wohlforth. The stability of a unipolar world. *International Security*, 24(1):5–41, 1999.
- D. Scott Bennett and Allan C. Stam. *The Behavioral Origins of War*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2004. Chapters 4-5 (focus on the “International System Level of Analysis”).

Optional Reading

- Randall L. Schweller. Tripolarity and the second world war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 37(1):73–103, 1993.
- Michael Mastanduno. Preserving the unipolar moment: Realist theories and u.s. grand strategy after the cold war. *International Security*, 21(4):49–88, 1997.
- Christopher Layne. The unipolar illusion: Why new great powers will rise. *International Security*, 17(4):5–51, 1993.
- Thomas J. Volgy and Lawrence E. Imwalle. Hegemonic and bipolar perspectives on the new world order. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(4):819–834, 1995.
- R. Harrison Wagner. Peace, war, and the balance of power. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):593–607, 1994.
- Joanne Gowa. Bipolarity, multipolarity, and free trade. *American Political Science Review*, 83(4):1245–1256, 1989.
- Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder. Chain gangs and passed bucks: Predicting alliance patterns in multipolarity. *International Organization*, 44(2):137–168, 1990.

January 31: Domestic Politics I: Democratic Peace

- John R. Oneal and Bruce M. Russett. The kantian peace: The pacific benefits of democracy, interdependence, and international organizations, 1885-1992. *World Politics*, 52(1):1–37, 1999.
- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4):791–807, 1999.
- Christopher Layne. Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace. *International Security*, 19(2):5–49, 1994.

- MICHAEL R. TOMZ and JESSICA L. P. WEEKS. Public opinion and the democratic peace. *The American Political Science Review*, 107(4):849–865, 2013.

Optional Reading

- Bruce Russett and John Oneal. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. W.W. Norton, New York, 2001. Chapters 2-3.
- Erik Gartzke. The capitalist peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1):166–191, 2007.
- Alexandre Debs and H.E. Goemans. Regime type, the fate of leaders, and war. *American Political Science Review*, 104(3):430–445, 2010.
- Jessica L. Weeks. Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):326–347, 2012.
- Mark Peceny, Caroline Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. Dictatorial peace? *American Political Science Review*, 96(1):15–26, 2002.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2005.
- Vipin Narang and Rebecca M. Nelson. Who are these belligerent democratizers? re-assessing the impact of democratization on war. *International Organization*, 63(2):357–379, 2009.
- Paul Huth and Todd Allee. *Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the 21st Century*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
- H. E. Goemans. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000.
- Douglas M. Gibler. Bordering on peace: Democracy, territorial issues, and conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(3):509–532, 2007.
- Allison Carnegie. 2021. “Secrecy in International Relations and Foreign Policy.” *Annual Review of Political Science*. Vol. 24, pp. 213-233.
- Lindsey O’Rourke. 2020. “The Strategic Logic of Covert Regime Change: U.S.-Backed Regime Change Campaigns during the Cold War.” *Security Studies*. Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 92-127.

February 7: Domestic Politics II: Audience Costs

- James D. Fearon. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):577–592, 1994.
- Kenneth A. Schultz. Domestic opposition and signaling in international crises. *American Political Science Review*, 92(4):829–844, 1998.

- Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard. The cost of empty threats: A penny, not a pound. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):437–456, 2011.
- Jessica L. Weeks. Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62(1):35–64, 2008.

Optional Reading

- Kenneth A. Schultz. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001. Chapters 1-5.
- Marc Trachtenberg. 2012. “Audience Costs: An Historical Analysis.” *Security Studies*. Vol. 21, No. 1, pp. 3-42.
- Alexandre Debs and Jessica C. Weiss. 2016. “Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 403-433.
- Matthew Levendusky and Michael C. Horowitz. When backing down is the right decision: Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. *Journal of Politics*, 74(2), 2012.
- Michael Tomz. Domestic audience costs in international relations: An experimental approach. *International Organization*, 61(4):821–840, 2007.
- Robert F. Trager and Lynn Vavreck. The political costs of crisis bargaining: Presidential rhetoric and the role of party. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(3):526–45, 2011.
- Joshua D. Kertzer and Ryan Brutger. Decomposing audience costs: Bringing the audience back into audience cost theory. *American Journal of Political Science*, 60(1):234–249, 2016.
- Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser. The illusion of democratic credibility. *International Organization*, 66(3):457–89, 2012.

February 14: Leaders

- Giacomo Chiozza and Hein E. Goemans. *Leaders and International Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011. Chapters 1-2.
- Matthew Fuhrmann. When do leaders free-ride? business experience and contributions to collective defense. *American Journal of Political Science*, 64(2):416–431, 2020.
- Sarah Croco. The decider’s dilemma: Leader culpability, domestic politics, and war termination. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):457–477, 2011.
- Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam. How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders. *International Organization*, 68(3):527–559, 2014.

Optional Reading

- Elizabeth N. Saunders. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2011. Chapters 1-2.
- Kenneth N. Waltz. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1959.
- Hein E. Goemans, Kristian Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. Introducing archigos: A dataset of political leaders. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(2):269–283, 2009.
- Jacques Hymans. *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Emotions, Identity, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
- Matthew Fuhrmann and Michael C. Horowitz. When leaders matter: Rebel experience and nuclear proliferation. *Journal of Politics*, 77(1):72–87, 2015.
- Scott Wolford. The turnover trap: New leaders, reputation, and international conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):772–788, 2007.
- Michael C. Horowitz, Allan C. Stam, and Cali M. Ellis. *Why Leaders Fight*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2015.
- Maryann Gallagher and Susan Allen. Presidential personality: Not just a nuisance. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 10(1):1–21, 2014.
- Thomas Gift and Daniel Krmaric. Who democratizes? western-educated leaders and regime transitions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 61(3):671–701, 2017.
- Benjamin F. Jones and Benjamin A. Olken. Do leaders matter? national leadership and growth since world war ii. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 120(3):835–864, 2005.
- Brian Rathbun, Joshua Kertzer, and Mark Paradis. Homo diplomaticus: Mixed-method evidence of variation in strategic rationality. *International Organization*, 71(S1):S33–S60, 2017.
- Jonathan Renshon, Allan Dafoe, and Paul Huth. Leader influence and reputation formation in world politics. *American Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming, 2017.

February 21: The Nuclear Revolution

- Robert Jervis. *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1989. Chapter 1.
- Nina Tannenwald. The nuclear taboo: The united states and the normative basis of nuclear non-use. *International Organization*, 53(3):433–468, 1999.
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. *Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017. Chapters 1, 2, and 7.

- Matthew Kroenig. Nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve: Explaining nuclear crisis outcomes. *International Organization*, 67(1), 2013.

Optional Reading

- Vipin Narang. *Nuclear Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Power Nuclear Postures and International Conflict*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2014. Chapters 1-2 and 9.
- Mark Bell and Nicholas Miller. Questioning the effect of nuclear weapons on conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59(1):74–92, 2015.
- Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz. *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed*. W. W. Norton, New York, 2003.
- Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal. Winning with the bomb. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):278–301, 2009.
- Erik Gartzke and Dong-Joon Jo. Bargaining, nuclear proliferation, and interstate disputes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):209–233, 2009.
- Michael Horowitz. The spread of nuclear weapons and international conflict: Does experience matter? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):234–57, 2009.
- Robert Rauchhaus. Evaluating the nuclear peace hypothesis: A quantitative approach. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):258–77, 2009.
- David Sobek, Dennis M. Foster, and Samuel B. Robison. Conventional wisdom? the effect of nuclear proliferation on armed conflict, 1945-2001. *International Studies Quarterly*, 56(1):149–162, 2012.
- Roseanne McManus, 2017. *Statements of Resolve: Achieving Coercive Credibility in International Conflict*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Caitlin Talmadge. 2017. “Would China Go Nuclear? Assessing the Risk of Chinese Nuclear Escalation in a Conventional War with the United States.” *International Security*. Vol. 41, No.4, pp. 50-92.
- Robert Powell. *Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 1990.
- Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. Crisis bargaining and nuclear blackmail. *International Organization*, 67(4):173–95, 2013.
- Keir Lieber and Daryl G. Press. 2020. *The Myth of the Nuclear Revolution: Power Politics in the Atomic Age*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Mark S. Bell. 2021. *Nuclear Reactions: How Nuclear-Armed States Behave*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

- James Lee. Foreign aid, development, and us strategic interests in the cold war. *International Studies Quarterly*, 66(1):sqab090, 2022.

February 28: Coercive Diplomacy and Signaling

- Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966. Chapters 1-3.
- James D. Fearon. Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1):68–90, 1997.
- Keren Yarhi-Milo, Joshua D. Kertzer, and Jonathan Renshon. Tying hands, sinking costs, and leader attributes. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 62(10):2150–2179, 2018.
- Joshua D. Kertzer, Brian C. Rathbun, and Nina Srinivasan Rathbun. The price of peace: Motivated reasoning and costly signaling in international relations. *International Organization*, 74(1):95–118, 2020.

Optional Reading

- Todd S. Sechser. Militarized compellent threats, 1918-2001. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 28(4):377–401, 2011.
- Nikolay Marinov, 2005. “Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?” *American Journal of Political Science* 49 (3): 564-576.
- Daniel Drezner, 1999. “The Trouble with Carrots: Transaction Costs, Conflict Expectations, and Economic Inducements,” *Security Studies* 9(1-2).
- Lyall, Jason, 2019. Civilian Casualties, Humanitarian Aid, and Insurgent Violence in Civil Wars. *International Organization* 73(4).
- Bryan Early, 2012. “Alliances and Trade with Sanctioned States: A Study of U.S. Economic Sanctions, 1950–2000,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56(3).
- Elena McLean and Taehee Whang, 2014. “Designing Foreign Policy: Voters, Special Interest Groups, and Economic Sanctions,” *Journal of Peace Research* 51(5).
- Jennifer Erickson, 2013. “Stopping the Legal Flow of Weapons: Compliance with Arms Embargoes, 1981-2004.” *Journal of Peace Research* 50(2).
- Benjamin Harris and Erik Lin-Greenberg, 2023. “Cheap Tweets? Crisis Signaling in the Age of Twitter.” Working paper. Available at: <http://eriklg.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/Cheap-Tweets6-Apr-2023online.pdf>.

March 6: Military Alliances

- Brett Ashley Leeds, 2003. “Do Alliances Deter Aggression? The Influence of Military Alliances on the Initiation of Militarized Interstate Disputes,” *American Journal of Political Science* 47(3).

- Michael Kenwick, John Vasquez and Matthew Powers. "Do Alliances Really Deter?" *Journal of Politics* 77(2): 943-954.
- Brett V Benson, Patrick R Bentley, and James Lee Ray. Ally provocateur: Why allies do not always behave. *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1):47–58, 2013.
- Michael Tomz, Jessica L P Weeks, and Kirk Bansak. How membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization transforms public support for war. *PNAS Nexus*, 2(7):pgad206, 07 2023.

Optional Reading

- James Morrow. 1991. "Alliances and Asymmetry: An Alternative to the Capability Aggregation Model of Alliances." *American Journal of Political Science* 35 (4): 904-933.
- Hal Brands and Peter D. Feaver, 2017. "What Are America's Alliances Good For?" *Parameters* 47(2).
- Brett Ashley Leeds. Alliance reliability in times of war: Explaining state decisions to violate treaties. *International Organization*, 57(4):801–827, 2003.
- Jesse C. Johnson and Brett Ashley Leeds. Defense pacts: A prescription for peace? *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(1):45–65, 2011.
- Brett Ashley Leeds, Andrew G. Long, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell. Reevaluating alliance reliability: Specific threats, specific promises. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 44(5):686–699, 2000.
- Douglas M. Gibler and John A. Vasquez. Uncovering the dangerous alliances, 1495–1980. *International Studies Quarterly*, 42(4):785–807, 1998.
- Mancur Jr. Olson and Richard Zeckhauser. An economic theory of alliances. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 48(3):266–279, 1966.
- Alastair Smith. Alliance formation and war. *International Studies Quarterly*, pages 405–425, 1995.
- Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser. Signaling alliance commitments: Hand-tying and sunk costs in extended nuclear deterrence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 58(4):919–935, 2014.

March 27: Air Power and Uses of Force

- Robert A. Pape. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1996. Chapters 1-4.
- Susan Hannah Allen and Carla Martinez Machain. Understanding the impact of air power. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 36(5):545–558, 2019.

- Jason Lyall, 2009. “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks?: Evidence from Chechnya” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(3).
- Alexander B. Downes and Lindsey A. O’Rourke, 2016. “You Can’t Always Get What You Want: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Seldom Improves Interstate Relations,” *International Security* 41(2).

Optional Reading

- Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis Kalyvas. Aerial bombing and counterinsurgency in the vietnam war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):201–218, 2011.
- Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter. When does aerial bombing work? quantitative empirical tests, 1917-1999. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(2):147–173, 2001.
- Ursula Daxecker and Michael Hess. Repression hurts: Coercive government responses and the demise of terrorist campaigns. *British Journal of Political Science*, 2012.
- Branislav L. Slantchev. Military coercion in interstate crises. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4):533–547, 2005.

April 3: Reputation and Resolve

- Joshua D. Kertzer. 2016. *Resolve in International Politics*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, Chapters 1-3.
- Daryl G. Press. The credibility of power: Assessing threats during the ‘appeasement’ crises of the 1930s. *International Security*, 29(2):136–169, 2004/2005.
- Mark J. C. Crescenzi. Reputation and interstate conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):382–396, 2007.
- Alex Weisiger and Keren Yarhi-Milo. Revisiting reputation: How past actions matter in international politics. *International Organization*, 69(2):473–495, 2015.

Optional Reading

- Alexandre Debs and Jessica C. Weiss. 2016. “Circumstances, Domestic Audiences, and Reputational Incentives in International Crisis Bargaining.” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 403-433.
- Barbara F. Walter. Building reputation: Why governments fight some separatists but not others. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2):313–330, 2006.
- Jonathan Mercer. *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1996.

- Todd S. Sechser. Goliath's curse: Coercive threats and asymmetric power. *International Organization*, 64(4):627–60, 2010.
- Douglas M. Gibler. The costs of renegeing: Reputation and alliance formation. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(3):426–454, 2008.
- Michael Tomz. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2007. Chapters 1-2, 6.
- Monica Duffy Toft. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2003.

April 10: Nuclear Proliferation

- Nuno P. Monteiro and Alexandre Debs. The strategic logic of nuclear proliferation. *International Security*, 39(2):7–51, 2014.
- Nicholas Miller, 2014. “The Secret Success of Nonproliferation Sanctions,” *International Organization* 68(4): 913-944.
- Matthew Fuhrmann and Yonatan Lupu. Do arms control treaties work? assessing the effectiveness of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(3):530–539, 2016.
- Eliza Gheorghe. 2019. “Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market.” *International Security*. Vol. 43, No. 4, pp. 88-127.

Optional Reading

- Alexander Debs and Nuno Monteiro. 2017. “Conflict and Cooperation on Nuclear Nonproliferation,” *Annual Review of Political Science* 20: 331-349.
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