

# POLS 631: Conflict Studies

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Spring 2013

Meeting Time: Wed. 4:10 – 7:00

Office Hours: Mon. 12:00 – 2:00, and by appt.

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## Course Description

This graduate seminar offers a survey of topics in the sub-field of conflict. The course is structured around major debates in the study of intrastate and, especially, interstate conflict including: Do nuclear weapons make coercive diplomacy more effective? Do democracies have advantages in international coercive bargaining? Can international institutions mitigate the risk of conflict? Do reputations matter in international politics? Why does terrorism occur? The purpose of this course is to examine and critique broad theoretical arguments in the sub-field – not to learn about any particular country or war. This course is designed to professionalize students and train them to critique existing research, identify original research questions, develop theoretical arguments, and test the hypotheses that flow from these arguments. Many of the course readings will employ statistical analysis. It would therefore be helpful if students have an interest in (and ideally experience with) quantitative empirical analysis.

## Course Requirements

There are three main requirements for this seminar:

- *Weekly critiques of the literature.* Students should prepare critiques based on the week's readings. In particular, students should identify five weaknesses or problems with the literature that they read for a given seminar. These critiques should zero in on major issues such as whether the argument is logically consistent and compelling and whether hypotheses are properly tested. Students may use bullet points to list their critiques; they need not prepare formal papers. The length should be 1-2 pages. The critiques should be emailed to Prof. Fuhrmann the night before class. This will constitute **15 percent of your grade.**
- *Class Participation.* I expect that students will come to class prepared, having read all of the assigned readings. Class participation represents **35 percent of your grade.**
- *Original Research Paper.* Students are required to write an original research paper on a topic related to international conflict. The topic does not need to be one that we cover in the course but conflict must be central to the analysis – either as a dependent or independent variable. Those who are PhD students in political science should conduct quantitative empirical analysis in their papers. My preference is that other students would do so as well, but I am open to alternatives (e.g., using qualitative historical analysis) that are appropriate based on one's background and career goals. The idea is that students will eventually submit revised versions of their papers for publication in

peer-reviewed journals, and present their work at professional conferences. All research proposals must be approved by me in advance. The paper constitutes **40 percent of your grade**. You will also give a presentation of your work at the end of the semester that will represent **10 percent of your grade**.

## Key Deadlines

- Midnight before each class meeting: Weekly critiques due.
- March 20: 5 page research proposal due.
- May 1: Papers due.

## Course Readings

All of the articles are available through the TAMU library in databases such as JSTOR or Google Scholar. Please let me know if you have questions about how to access the articles. We will read portions of the following books. You may purchase these books if you like, but the relevant excerpts will be available through the library's course reserve system.

- Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966.
- Kenneth A. Schultz. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001.
- Robert A. Pape. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1996.
- Bruce Russett and John Oneal. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. W.W. Norton, New York, 2001.
- Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam. *Democracies at War*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002.
- Matthew Fuhrmann. *Atomic Assistance: How 'Atoms for Peace' Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2012.
- H. E. Goemans. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000.
- Dan Reiter. *How Wars End*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2010.
- Michael Tomz. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2007.
- Jonathan Mercer. *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1996.

- Giacomo Chiozza and Hein E. Goemans. *Leaders and International Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011.
- Elizabeth N. Saunders. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2011.

## Course Schedule

### *January 16: How to Study Conflict*

### *January 23: Threats, Power, and Coercive Diplomacy*

Debate: How can states use the threat of military force to get their way in international politics – without actually having to fight? Do nuclear weapons make coercive diplomacy more effective?

#### *Required Reading*

1. Thomas C. Schelling. *Arms and Influence*. Yale University Press, New Haven, 1966. Chapters 1-3.
2. James D. Fearon. Signaling foreign policy interests: Tying hands versus sinking costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 41(1):68–90, 1997.
3. Matthew Kroenig. Nuclear superiority and the balance of resolve: Explaining nuclear crisis outcomes. *International Organization*, 67(1), 2013.
4. Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann. Crisis bargaining and nuclear blackmail. *International Organization*, 67(1), 2013.

#### *Optional Reading*

- Robert J. Art. To what ends military power? *International Security*, 4(4):3–35, 1980.
- Robert J. Art. Coercive diplomacy: What do we know? In Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, editors, *The United States and Coercive Diplomacy*, pages 359–420. U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 2003
- Thomas C. Schelling. *The Strategy of Conflict*. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1960.
- Daniel Byman and Matthew C. Waxman. *The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001.
- Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal. Winning with the bomb. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 53(2):278–301, 2009.

## ***January 30: Democracy and Resolve***

Debate: Do democracies have advantages in international crisis bargaining?

*Special guests: Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser*

### *Required Reading*

1. Kenneth A. Schultz. *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001. Chapters 1-5.
2. Jack Snyder and Erica Borghard. The cost of empty threats: A penny, not a pound. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):437–456, 2011.
3. Alexander B. Downes and Todd S. Sechser. Democracies and the credibility of coercive threats. *International Organization*, 66(3):457–489, 2012.
4. Jessica L. Weeks. Autocratic audience costs: Regime type and signaling resolve. *International Organization*, 62(1):35–64, 2008.

### *Optional Reading*

- James D. Fearon. Domestic political audiences and the escalation of international disputes. *American Political Science Review*, 88(3):577–592, 1994.
- Kenneth A. Schultz. Looking for audience costs. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(1):32–60, 2001.
- Erik Gartzke and Yonatan Lupu. Still looking for audience costs. *Security Studies*, 21(3), 2012.
- Matthew Levendusky and Michael C. Horowitz. When backing down is the right decision: Partisanship, new information, and audience costs. *Journal of Politics*, 74(2), 2012.
- Marc Trachtenburg. Audience costs: An historical analysis. *Security Studies*, 21(1), 2012.

## ***February 6: Extended (Immediate) Deterrence***

Debate: How can countries use military threats to protect their friends? What are some of the methodological challenges associated with studying deterrence?

### *Required Reading*

1. Paul K. Huth and Bruce Russett. Deterrence failure and crisis escalation. *International Studies Quarterly*, 32(1):29–45, 1988.
2. Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein. Deterrence: The elusive dependent variable. *World Politics*, 42(3):336–369, 1990.
3. Paul K. Huth. The extended deterrent value of nuclear weapons. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 34(2):270–290, 1990.
4. James D. Fearon. Selection effects and deterrence. *International Interactions*, 28(1):5–29, 2002.

### *Optional Reading*

- Curtis S. Signorino and Ahmer Tarar. A unified theory and test of extended immediate deterrence. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(3):586–605, 2006.
- Robert Jervis. Rational deterrence: Theory and evidence. *World Politics*, 41(2):183–207, 1989.
- Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke. Deterrence and foreign policy. *World Politics*, 41(2):170–182, 1989.

## ***February 13: Military Coercion***

Debate: Can states get their way by punishing their adversaries militarily?

### *Required Reading*

1. Robert A. Pape. *Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion in War*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1996. Chapters 1-4.
2. Michael Horowitz and Dan Reiter. When does aerial bombing work? quantitative empirical tests, 1917-1999. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(2):147–173, 2001.
3. Matthew Adam Kocher, Thomas B. Pepinsky, and Stathis Kalyvas. Aerial bombing and counterinsurgency in the vietnam war. *American Journal of Political Science*, 55(2):201–218, 2011.
4. Branislav L. Slantchev. Military coercion in interstate crises. *American Political Science Review*, 99(4):533–547, 2005.

### *Optional Reading*

- Ursula Daxecker and Michael Hess. Repression hurts: Coercive government responses and the demise of terrorist campaigns. *British Journal of Political Science*, 2012.

## ***February 20: Democratic Peace***

Debate: Are democracies less likely to fight wars? If so, why?

### *Required Reading*

1. Bruce Russett and John Oneal. *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. W.W. Norton, New York, 2001. Chapters 2-3.
2. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James Morrow, Randolph Siverson, and Alastair Smith. An institutional explanation of the democratic peace. *American Political Science Review*, 93(4):791–807, 1999.
3. Douglas M. Gibling. Bordering on peace: Democracy, territorial issues, and conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 51(3):509–532, 2007.
4. Christopher Layne. Kant or cant: The myth of the democratic peace. *International Security*, 19(2):5–49, 1994.
5. Mark Peceny, Caroline Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. Dictatorial peace? *American Political Science Review*, 96(1):15–26, 2002.

### *Optional Reading*

- Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder. *Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War*. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 2005.
- Vipin Narang and Rebecca M. Nelson. Who are these belligerent democratizers? re-assessing the impact of democratization on war. *International Organization*, 63(2):357–379, 2009.
- Paul Huth and Todd Allee. *Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the 21st Century*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.
- Jessica L. Weeks. Strongmen and straw men: Authoritarian regimes and the initiation of international conflict. *American Political Science Review*, 106(2):326–347, 2012.

## ***February 27: International Institutions***

Debate: How do international institutions matter for international conflict?

### *Required Reading*

1. John J. Mearsheimer. The false promise of international institutions. *International Security*, 19(3):5–49, 1994.

2. Virginia Page Fortna. Scraps of paper? agreements and the durability of peace. *International Organization*, 57(2):337–372, 2003.
3. Brett Ashley Leeds. Do alliances deter aggression? the influence of military alliances on the initiation of militarized interstate disputes. *American Journal of Political Science*, 47(3):427–439, 2003.
4. Paul K. Huth, Sarah E. Croco, and Benjamin J. Appel. Does international law promote the peaceful settlement of international disputes? evidence from the study of territorial conflicts since 1945. *American Political Science Review*, 105(2):415–436, 2011.
5. Matthew Fuhrmann. *Atomic Assistance: How ‘Atoms for Peace’ Programs Cause Nuclear Insecurity*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2012. Chapter 9.

#### *Optional Reading*

- Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin. The promise of institutionalist theory. *International Security*, 20(1):39–51, 1995.

### ***March 6: Democracy and Military Victory***

Debate: Are democracies more likely to win the wars they fight?

#### *Required Reading*

1. Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam. *Democracies at War*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2002. Chapters 1-3.
2. Michael C. Desch. Democracy and victory: Why regime type hardly matters. *International Security*, 27(2):5–47, 2002.
3. Alexander B. Downes. How smart and tough are democracies? *International Security*, 33(4):9–51, 2009.

#### *Optional Reading*

- Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson, and James Morrow. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005.

### ***March 13: Spring Break***

### ***March 20: War Termination***

Debate: Why and how do international disputes end?

### *Required Reading*

1. H. E. Goemans. *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2000. Chapters 2-3.
2. Dan Reiter. *How Wars End*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2010. Chapters 2-3 + one of the case studies.
3. James D. Fearon. Why do some civil wars last so much longer than others? *Journal of Peace Research*, 41(3):275–301, 2004.
4. Sarah Croco. The decider’s dilemma: Leader culpability, domestic politics, and war termination. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):457–477, 2011.
5. Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl. The initiation and termination of enduring rivalries: The impact of political shocks. *American Journal of Political Science*, 39(1):30–52, 1995.

### *Optional Reading*

- Allan C. Stam. *Win, Lose, or Draw: Domestic Politics and the Crucible of War*. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1996.

## ***March 27: Reputation***

Debate: Do reputations matter in international politics?

### *Required Reading*

1. Daryl G. Press. The credibility of power: Assessing threats during the ‘appeasement’ crises of the 1930s. *International Security*, 29(2):136–169, 2004/2005.
2. Barbara F. Walter. Building reputation: Why governments fight some separatists but not others. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(2):313–330, 2006.
3. Michael Tomz. *Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Centuries*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2007. Chapters 1-2, 6.
4. Jonathan Mercer. *Reputation and International Politics*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 1996. Chapter 1.

### *Optional Reading*

- Todd S. Sechser. Goliath’s curse: Coercive threats and asymmetric power. *International Organization*, 64(4):627–60, 2010.



- Mark J. C. Crescenzi. Reputation and interstate conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):382–396, 2007.
- Monica Duffy Toft. *The Geography of Ethnic Violence: Identity, Interests, and the Indivisibility of Territory*. Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2003.

### ***April 3: Resources***

*Because of the International Studies Association conference in San Francisco we will not be holding a formal class meeting. However, you are expected to complete all of the assigned reading and submit your weekly critique. You are also expected to use the class meeting time to work on your research papers.*

Debate: Do natural resources affect conflict? If so, how?

#### *Required Reading*

1. Thomas Homer-Dixon. Environmental scarcities and violent conflict: Evidence from cases. *International Security*, 19(1):5–40, 1994.
2. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler. Greed and grievance in civil war. *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56:563–595, 2004.
3. James D. Fearon. Primary commodity exports and civil war. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4):483–507, 2005.
4. Jeff D. Colgan. Oil and revolutionary governments: Fuel for conflict. *International Organization*, 64(4):661–694, 2010.
5. Hans Petter Wollebaek Tøset, Nils Petter Gleditsch, and Havard Hegre. Shared rivers and interstate conflict. *Political Geography*, 19:971–996, 2000.

#### *Optional Reading*

- Michael Ross. How does natural resource wealth influence civil wars? *International Organization*, 58, 2004.

### ***April 10: Leaders***

Debate: Do individual leaders matter?

#### *Required Reading*

1. Giacomo Chiozza and Hein E. Goemans. *Leaders and International Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2011. Chapters 1-2.

2. Scott Wolford. The turnover trap: New leaders, reputation, and international conflict. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(4):772–788, 2007.
3. Elizabeth N. Saunders. *Leaders at War: How Presidents Shape Military Interventions*. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, N.Y., 2011. Chapters 1-2 and one of the case studies (Chapters 3-6)).
4. Michael C. Horowitz and Allan C. Stam. How prior military experience influences the future militarized behavior of leaders. *Typescript, University of Pennsylvania*, 2012.

### *Optional Reading*

- Kenneth N. Waltz. *Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis*. Columbia University Press, New York, 1959. If you haven't read this already, it is strongly recommended.
- Hein E. Goemans, Kristian Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. Introducing archigos: A dataset of political leaders. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(2):269–283, 2009.
- Jacques Hymans. *The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Emotions, Identity, and Foreign Policy*. Cambridge University Press, New York, 2006.

## ***April 17: Terrorism***

Debate: Why does terrorism occur?

### *Required Reading*

1. Robert A. Pape. The strategic logic of suicide terrorism. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3):343–361, 2003.
2. Sara Jackson Wade and Dan Reiter. Does democracy matter? regime type and suicide terrorism. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 51(2):329–348, 2007.
3. Walter Enders and Todd Sandler. The effectiveness of antiterrorism policies: A vector autoregression-intervention analysis. *American Political Science Review*, 87(2), 1993.
4. Victor Asal and R. Karl Rethemeyer. The nature of the beast: Organizational structures and the lethality of terrorist attacks. *Journal of Politics*, 70(2):437–449, 2008.
5. Andrew H. Kydd and Barbara F. Walter. The strategies of terrorism. *International Security*, 31(1):49–79, 2006.

### *Optional Reading*

- Martha Crenshaw. The causes of terrorism. *Comparative Politics*, 13(4):379–399, 1981.

- Quan Li. Does democracy promote or reduce transnational terrorist incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(2):278–297, 2005.
- Erica Chenoweth. Democratic competition and terrorist activity. *Journal of Politics*, 72(1):16–30, 2008.
- Ethan Bueno de Mesquita and Eric Dickson. The propaganda of the deed: Terrorism, counterterrorism, and mobilization. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(2):364–381, 2007.

***April 24: Research Presentations***